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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-1927 
_______________ 
 
THOMAS KIRSCHLING, 
                                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATLANTIC CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Civ. No. 1-11-cv-04479) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 12, 2015) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
                                                   
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Thomas Kirschling appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to 
the Atlantic City Board of Education. Kirschling’s sole claim is for race-based constructive 
discharge under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.1 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, 
et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
Kirschling, a Caucasian male, worked as the Atlantic City School District’s 
Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources from 2000 to 2009. The District educates 
over 7,000 mostly African-American students, and Kirschling’s position put him in charge 
of personnel management. Kirschling was a longtime public school human resources 
professional who holds a Ph. D. in education, and it is not disputed that he was highly 
qualified for his position. According to Kirschling, personnel matters in the District were 
highly politicized, and Board members often interceded on behalf of family members 
and/or politically connected individuals who were candidates for jobs. On Kirschling’s 
telling, he and Board members clashed during his tenure over his unwillingness to favor 
Board members’ preferred candidates, as well as over his implementation of the Board’s 
drug testing policy, which he interpreted to require testing of all candidates for internal 
promotion. The Board was predominantly African-American at all relevant points. 
In 2007, Kirschling negotiated a new three-year contract that made him the highest 
paid Assistant Superintendent in the District. The April 2008 election caused a change in 
                                                   
1 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction because Kirschling is a citizen of Florida and 
the Board is a citizen of New Jersey. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction to review 
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the Board’s composition, however, and Board members hostile to Kirschling now 
commanded a majority. The new majority immediately sought to oust Kirschling, and by 
late 2008 Kirschling and the Board were in buyout negotiations. As part of the negotiations, 
Kirschling made a buyout demand that claimed entitlement to 120 sick and vacation days, 
including 96 days “rolled over” from his previous employment with a different school 
district. In February 2009, the District notified Kirschling that it believed that 34 of his 
claimed days were not properly claimed under the District’s comp-time policy, and further 
that he failed to report as vacation 11 days for which he was out of state. In March 2009, 
the District notified Kirschling that it learned he had been previously compensated for the 
96 days “rolled over” from his previous employer and that the District believed he 
misrepresented this fact at the start of his employment in 2000. The District suspended 
Kirschling with pay pending investigation, and the suspension made local news. With the 
Board preparing formal charges of fraud to be presented to criminal prosecutors and state 
tenure authorities, Kirschling resigned outright in July 2009. Kirschling’s duties were 
assumed on an interim basis by a Caucasian woman, Donna Haye, and a year later they 
were permanently assumed by an African-American woman, Diane Saunders.  
In June 2011, Kirschling filed the instant suit in New Jersey state court alleging race-
based constructive discharge in violation of New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination. 
According to Kirschling, his resignation under duress was far from voluntary, and the 
Board’s campaign to oust him—including the allegedly improper time record charges—
                                                                                                                                                                    
the final order of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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was motivated by improper considerations related to his race. The Board removed the case 
to the District of New Jersey, and the District Court granted summary judgment to the 
Board on the basis that Kirschling failed to state a prima facie case. Kirschling then filed 
this appeal.2 
Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff states a prima facie case of race-based 
constructive discharge by showing (1) that he is in a protected class or that the employer 
may be the unusual one that discriminates against the majority; (2) he was otherwise 
qualified and performing the essential functions of the job; (3) his resignation was 
constructively a discharge; and (4) that the employer thereafter sought similarly qualified 
individuals for the job. Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 550-51 (1990).  
The District Court entered judgment for the Board on the basis that Kirschling 
cannot show a constructive discharge.3 A discrimination claim based on constructive 
                                                   
2 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Doe v. Indian River 
Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). In doing so, we apply the same standard 
as the district court. Id. That is, summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether summary 
judgment is warranted, we “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor.” Doe, 653 F.3d at 275 n.7.  
3 The District Court also concluded that the background circumstances of the case raised no 
suspicion that the Board is “the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” 
See Erickson, 117 N.J. at 551. We have previously explained that “[s]tating the prima facie 
case in terms of ‘background circumstances’ and the uniqueness of the particular employer 
is both problematic and unnecessary.” Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 
1999). “[M]any of the courts that have tried to apply such an analysis have concluded that 
it results in a heightened burden for the plaintiff despite the . . . proclamations to the 
contrary by the court that developed the test.” Id. 
 5 
 
discharge arises when “an employer knowingly permit[s] conditions of discrimination in 
employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.” 
Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Cir., 174 N.J. 1, 27-29 (2002). “The standard 
envisions a sense of outrageous, coercive[,] and unconscionable requirements . . . 
[involving] more egregious conduct than that sufficient for a hostile work environment 
claim.” Id. at 28. Furthermore, “an employee has the obligation to do what is necessary and 
reasonable in order to remain employed rather than simply quit.” Id. “A trial court should 
consider the nature of the harassment, the closeness of the working relationship between 
the harasser and the victim, whether the employee resorted to internal grievance 
procedures, the responsiveness of the employer to the employee's complaints, and all other 
relevant circumstances.” Id. 
 Applying these standards, we agree with the District Court that Kirschling pled no 
facts that would make a reasonable person feel there was no choice but to resign. No doubt 
that Board members’ criticism of his job performance and open desire to remove him made 
for a stressful and unwelcome experience, but Kirschling’s allegations here fall far short of 
the unremitting, proximate harassment contemplated by New Jersey law. See id. Nor can 
we conclude that Kirschling was forced to resign in light of the disputed fraud allegations. 
The tenure laws prevented the District from firing Kirschling before proving its case against 
him to the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Education, see N.J.A.C. 6A:3-
5.5, and an accused employee may not claim involuntary resignation where he resigned 
without availing himself of procedural protections against unsubstantiated charges. See 
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Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010); Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 
F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1995). By declining to fight the allegedly wrongful 
accusations on the merits, Kirschling failed to do what was “necessary and reasonable in 
order to remain employed.” See Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 28. 
Because Kirschling cannot show a constructive discharge, he fails to state a prima 
facie case of discrimination. The District Court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.  
 
 
 
 
